clawcut
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
ffmpegbinary to perform video processing tasks such as audio extraction, silence detection, and video concatenation. These operations are executed usingsubprocess.runwith argument lists, which is a secure way to handle external commands. - Evidence: Subprocess calls found in
scripts/pipeline.pywithinsplit_video_to_scenes,trim_silence,_extract_last_frame, andgenerate_video_pipelinefunctions. - Mitigations: The skill uses list-based arguments instead of shell strings and allows the ffmpeg path to be configured via environment variables.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Contains an indirect prompt injection surface where user-provided video topics or analyzed reference content are interpolated into downstream prompts for the Veo video generation model.
- Ingestion points: User input
topicinscripts/app.pyand reference video analysis inscripts/pipeline.py. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on structured JSON output from Gemini to define scenes, but does not use explicit delimiters to isolate user-controlled visual descriptions in the final Veo generation prompts.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute file system operations (saving clips) and network operations (Vertex AI API calls).
- Sanitization: No explicit filtering or sanitization of the user-provided topic is performed before it is sent to the LLM.
Audit Metadata