fanqie-masterclass
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates by ingesting user-provided story ideas, outlines, and full-text drafts to perform automated expansion, diagnosis, and polishing, which exposes the agent to instructions embedded within untrusted user data.
- Ingestion points: The skill takes 'core梗' (core plots) in
references/chapter4-ai-workflow.mdand full novel text inreferences/chapter5-polish.mdto perform '去AI味' (de-AI flavoring) processing. - Boundary markers: There are no specified delimiters or 'ignore' instructions provided to the agent to distinguish between the user's creative writing and potentially malicious instructions embedded within that writing.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to generate content, call external workflows, and provide financial/tax guidance based on input.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization or validation protocols for the text provided for polishing or expansion.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill encourages the use of an external, third-party AI writing platform that is not recognized as a well-known service or a verified vendor resource.
- Evidence: Files
references/chapter4-ai-workflow.mdandreferences/chapter6-monetize.mddirect users to usehttps://xingyuexiezuo.com/?workflow=1906for one-click content generation and workflow execution.
Audit Metadata