flux
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from a shared state engine, which creates an attack surface where malicious actors could inject instructions into the agent's context through shared entity properties.\n
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent's environment via the
getandlistcommands inscripts/flux.sh(as documented inSKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mdlack specific delimiters or warnings to the agent to treat data retrieved from the Flux API as untrusted or to ignore any natural language instructions embedded within that data.\n - Capability inventory: The skill provides capabilities for network operations (
curlviascripts/flux.sh) and file system access (inherent to the agent context), which could be abused if an injected instruction is followed.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from the API before it is processed by the agent.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality of the skill is provided through a bash script (
scripts/flux.sh) that executes shell commands and makes network requests.\n - Execution method: The script uses
curlto interact with the Flux API athttps://api.flux-universe.com(or a user-definedFLUX_URL).\n - Injection surface: Arguments passed by the agent to the
publishandbatchcommands are interpolated into JSON payloads within the script, which could potentially lead to malformed commands or JSON injection if inputs are not carefully managed by the agent.
Audit Metadata