pr-flow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources that are not fully controlled by the agent, creating a vector for instructions to be injected via GitHub issues or reviews.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read issue comments (
gh issue view --comments) in Step 1 and pull request review comments (gh api .../comments) in Step 8. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or system-level instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the text fetched from GitHub.
- Capability inventory: The agent possess extensive capabilities including filesystem access (via worktrees), dependency management (
npm install), and repository mutation/interaction (git push,gh pr create,gh apifor mutations). - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is applied to the metadata or comments retrieved from the GitHub API before they are processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the host system's shell to perform development tasks.
- Evidence: It executes various subcommands for
git(worktree, fetch, commit), the GitHub CLIgh(view, edit, pr, api), andnpm(run, install). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs automated package installation which involves fetching resources from external registries.
- Evidence: Step 2 explicitly calls for
npm installwithin the new worktree to build the server environment. This is treated as safe as it targets the vendor's own repository structure.
Audit Metadata