pr-flow

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources that are not fully controlled by the agent, creating a vector for instructions to be injected via GitHub issues or reviews.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read issue comments (gh issue view --comments) in Step 1 and pull request review comments (gh api .../comments) in Step 8.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or system-level instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the text fetched from GitHub.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possess extensive capabilities including filesystem access (via worktrees), dependency management (npm install), and repository mutation/interaction (git push, gh pr create, gh api for mutations).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is applied to the metadata or comments retrieved from the GitHub API before they are processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the host system's shell to perform development tasks.
  • Evidence: It executes various subcommands for git (worktree, fetch, commit), the GitHub CLI gh (view, edit, pr, api), and npm (run, install).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs automated package installation which involves fetching resources from external registries.
  • Evidence: Step 2 explicitly calls for npm install within the new worktree to build the server environment. This is treated as safe as it targets the vendor's own repository structure.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 28, 2026, 03:28 PM