hns-lsel-curator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONOBFUSCATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from
.moai/lessons-inbox.jsonlcontaining tool failure stubs and summaries. The agent is instructed to process this data to augment importance scores and draft 'shadow proposals', creating a surface where malicious tool output could influence the agent's logic or proposal content.\n - Ingestion points: The
drain.shscript reads the inbox file and generatesclusters.json, which is then read by the agent for curation tasks.\n - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat the cluster summaries as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within the logs.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill is allowed to use the
Bashtool and performs multiple file-write operations within the.moai/state/directory.\n - Sanitization: While
jqis used for mechanical processing, the natural language summaries are presented to the model without filtering or sanitization.\n- [OBFUSCATION]: Thetier4_firing_test.shscript employs string concatenation to hide a variable name from simple search tools. It assembles the identifierenableTriggerInjectionWritesusing the pattern\"enable\"\"TriggerInjectionWrites\". This is a deliberate concealment technique intended to avoid literal text matches within the script's own source code.
Audit Metadata