hns-lsel-curator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests failure stubs from
.moai/lessons-inbox.jsonlto generate curation candidates. Because these stubs contain logs from tool executions that could be influenced by external or untrusted data, there is a risk that malicious instructions could be injected into the agent's evolution and proposal pipeline. - Ingestion points:
.moai/lessons-inbox.jsonl(read and sliced indrain.sh). - Boundary markers: The data is formatted as JSON and processed using
jq. - Capability inventory: The skill uses Bash, Grep, and Glob to perform file operations and write to the
.moai/state/andmemory/directories. - Sanitization: The skill uses a frequency gate and severity filtering to reduce noise, but does not explicitly sanitize the text of the failure stubs for prompt injection patterns.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
backlog_check.shscript is designed to emit a<system-reminder>tag tostderr. This mechanism provides a way for scripts to inject instructions directly into the orchestrator's context, potentially bypassing standard input controls. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple local shell scripts (
drain.sh,reflect.sh,backlog_check.sh,backlog_check_test.sh) to perform deterministic logic. These scripts utilize common utilities likejq,awk,find, andsedto manipulate files within the project's state and memory directories. - [OBFUSCATION]: The
tier4_firing_test.shscript employs simple string concatenation ("enable""TriggerInjectionWrites") to assemble a variable name, effectively obscuring the literal token from simple static analysis checks that look for theenableTriggerInjectionWritesidentifier.
Audit Metadata