azure-devops

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted content from Azure DevOps (such as work item descriptions and pull request comments) which may contain malicious instructions for the agent or downstream consumers.
  • Ingestion points: fetch-work-item.py and fetch-pr-comments.py retrieve text content from the Azure DevOps REST API.
  • Boundary markers: The skill normalizes all data into a strictly defined JSON handoff contract (assets/schemas/ado-openspec-handoff.schema.json) to isolate the untrusted content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses write capabilities (creating work items, comments, and pull requests) via scripts like create-work-item.py, though these are explicitly gated by mandatory dry-run outputs and user confirmation flags.
  • Sanitization: normalize-work-item.py uses an HTML parser to strip tags from description and comment fields, and _ado_lib.py implements recursive redaction to prevent tokens from leaking in output.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Orchestration scripts execute internal Python utilities to perform multi-stage data processing.
  • Evidence: generate-handoff.py and emit-handoff.py use subprocess.run to call sibling scripts such as fetch-work-item.py and validate-handoff.py. These calls use sys.executable and structured argument lists (with shell=False) to ensure local execution context and prevent injection.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill handles sensitive Personal Access Tokens (PATs) and implements controls to prevent unauthorized data transfer.
  • Evidence: _ado_lib.py contains a strict URL allowlist (dev.azure.com, vssps.dev.azure.com, and *.visualstudio.com) for all authenticated requests. This restricts the agent's ability to send data or credentials to non-Azure DevOps domains.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 03:18 PM