implement-workitem
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from Azure DevOps work-item descriptions and PR feedback, creating a surface for potential injection attacks.\n
- Ingestion points: Ingests data from work-item descriptions, comments, and PR feedback (SKILL.md, Workflow Step 1 and 2).\n
- Boundary markers: Explicitly labels input as 'untrusted source material' and instructs the agent to disregard embedded commands (SKILL.md, Trust and authorization section).\n
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute Git commands, interact with the Azure CLI, and perform code changes via
plan-execution(SKILL.md, Handoffs section).\n - Sanitization: Requires verification of requirements against repository evidence and mandates multiple user approval checkpoints (SKILL.md, workflow checkpoints A through E).\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on executing shell commands for repository management and API interaction.\n
- Evidence: Orchestrates
gitcommands for worktree and branch management, uses the Azure DevOps CLI (az repos pr create) for PR creation, and runs a local scriptscripts/generate-handoff.pyfor payload normalization (SKILL.md and references/branch-and-publication.md).
Audit Metadata