spec-writing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input in the form of Azure DevOps handoff JSON, which includes user-generated work item descriptions and pull request comments. This creates a surface for malicious actors to attempt to influence the agent's logic or override instructions during the spec-authoring process.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts an
azure-devopshandoff JSON object containingwork_itemdetails andpr_comments(documented inSKILL.mdandrules/handoff-consumption.md).\n - Boundary markers: Instructions mandate segregating PR comments into a 'Review Context' section and providing clear output schemas to maintain structural integrity (
references/workflow.md).\n - Capability inventory: The skill performs complex text generation and can execute local Python scripts for validation (
scripts/validate-output.py).\n - Sanitization: Explicit rules in
rules/handoff-consumption.mdforbid the promotion of PR comments to requirements and require validation of theproducerfield and JSON structure before processing.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's test utility utilizes dynamic module loading to import logic from external scripts within the skill directory, which is a common but sensitive programming pattern.\n - Evidence:
tests/run-validation.pyusesimportlib.util.spec_from_file_locationto loadscripts/validate-output.py.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to run local Python scripts to validate the integrity and quality of its own output, providing the agent with executable capabilities over local assets.\n - Evidence: References to
scripts/validate-output.pyandtests/run-validation.pyinSKILL.mdand the skill's assets definition.
Audit Metadata