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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied questions and codebase data to generate architectural explanations, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User input
{QUESTION}is interpolated into subagent prompts inSKILL.md. Subagents read external files from the codebase viaRead,Grep, andGlobtools inexplorer-prompt.md, and the explainer subagent ingests synthesized findings inexplainer-prompt.md. - Boundary markers: The templates in
explorer-prompt.mdandexplainer-prompt.mduse Markdown blockquotes and headers to separate instructions from data, but do not include explicit warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the codebase files. - Capability inventory: Subagents are explicitly restricted to
read-onlyaccess in theSKILL.mdspawn definitions. Tools available are limited to read and search functions (Read,Grep, andGlob). No file-write, network operations, or shell execution capabilities were detected across any of the scripts or templates. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping, validation, or filtering of the content read from the codebase before it is passed to the synthesis stage in
explainer-prompt.md.
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