show-me-your-work
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the conversation transcript to audit the decision log. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions hidden in earlier turns or external data could influence the audit process or the behavior of review subagents.
- Ingestion points: The
historyrecipe is used to read the current session's transcript in bothSKILL.md(Audit section) and during the cross-model review phase. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly warn the agent: "Don't read other projects' history. That reads unrelated private chats." This provides a logical boundary to prevent cross-project data exposure.
- Capability inventory: The agent can append to local files using
scripts/log.shand spawn subagents withaccess: fullvia thearenaplatform feature. - Sanitization: The
scripts/log.shutility contains aclean()function that actively sanitizes inputs by stripping tabs, newlines, and carriage returns (preventing TSV structure corruption) and prefixing spreadsheet formula characters (=,+,-,@) with a single quote to prevent CSV/TSV injection attacks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a local bash script
scripts/log.shto handle logging. This script was analyzed and found to be implemented securely, usingset -euo pipefailfor error handling and avoiding dangerous primitives likeevalor unsanitized input to command shells.
Audit Metadata