cdp
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The installation script (
scripts/setup) appends a PATH export to the user's shell configuration files (such as.zshrc,.bashrc, or.profile) to ensure its CLI tool remains permanently available. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The SDK daemon (
sdk/repl.ts) implements an HTTP server with an/evalendpoint that executes arbitrary JavaScript strings provided in the request body using theeval()function. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The recording module (
sdk/recording.ts) fetches therrweblibrary from the jsDelivr CDN at runtime and subsequently injects it into browser tab contexts to enable session capture. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The framework includes logic in
sdk/session.tsthat uses macOSosascriptto programmatically send a Return keystroke to the "Dia" browser process, effectively bypassing security dialogs requesting permission for remote debugging connections. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from web pages into the agent's context.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via accessibility snapshots and DOM queries performed in
sdk/page.tsandsdk/interaction.ts. - Boundary markers: Absent. Snapshots of web content are provided to the agent without delimiters or specific warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the page data.
- Capability inventory: The framework provides extensive capabilities, including arbitrary code execution via the REPL daemon, network requests from the browser context, and local file access as suggested in its usage recipes.
- Sanitization: The skill redacts sensitive field values (passwords, PII) by default and uses isolated execution environments for its injected scripts.
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