aap
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic context injection in
SKILL.mdto execute a shell command at load time. Specifically, it runspython3 ~/.claude/skills/aap/scripts/aap_parser.py $ARGUMENTS. The direct interpolation of$ARGUMENTSinto the shell string without proper quoting or escaping enables shell argument injection which could lead to arbitrary command execution if a user provides malicious input. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external Agent Action Plan (AAP) documents, which are untrusted data sources. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where content within those documents could manipulate the agent.
- Ingestion points: The content of the file at
<file-path>is read by the parser and returned to the agent's context (inscripts/aap_parser.py). - Boundary markers: There are no markers or delimiters used to separate the document content from the agent's instructions, nor is the agent warned to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools like
Bash,Read,Glob, andGrepvia its allowed-tools configuration. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the ingested text to prevent it from containing malicious instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The file
scripts/aap_parser.pyutilizes dynamic module loading via__import__to load thetree_sitter_markdownlibrary. While the module name is hardcoded in this script, dynamic loading is a technique that can be used to bypass static analysis or load modified code at runtime.
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