clips-studio
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-supplied text to generate video content and audio via an external provider (fal.ai). A lack of technical sanitization on these inputs creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions could attempt to bypass provider safety filters or the skill's own 'honesty' guidelines.\n
- Ingestion points: User-provided prompts and motion briefs in
SKILL.mdstages 1, 2, and 3.\n - Boundary markers: Prompts are delimited by quotes when passed to the CLI script in
SKILL.md, but there is no validation of the content itself.\n - Capability inventory: The
scripts/falvid.pytool performs network egress toapi.fal.aiand writes binary video files to the local file system.\n - Sanitization: No input sanitization or content filtering is implemented in
scripts/falvid.py.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Thescripts/falvid.pyscript contains a utility function_autoload_fal_keysthat automatically searches the current working directory and the user's home directory (~) for files that might contain API credentials. The script identifies targets based on keywords (e.g., 'fal', 'key', 'api', '.env') and reads their full content to search for theFAL_KEYpattern. This behavior involves automated discovery and reading of potentially sensitive local files to extract secrets stored in plain text.
Audit Metadata