input-token-overheads
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive internal agent files to calculate per-turn token overhead. Although no network exfiltration is present, the capability to read these files constitutes data exposure.
- Evidence:
scripts/audit_overheads.pyand Python snippets inSKILL.mdread from~/.hermes/memories/USER.md,~/.hermes/memories/MEMORY.md, and~/.hermes/config.yamlto measure character and token counts. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from skill descriptions and memory files without implementing sanitization or boundary markers, creating a surface for potential instruction injection if these files contain malicious content.
- Ingestion points: Skill frontmatter descriptions from all files in
~/.hermes/skills/, as well as content fromMEMORY.mdandUSER.mdprocessed by the audit scripts. - Boundary markers: None identified in the audit scripts or instructions to separate instructions from analyzed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has file system read access, SQLite database access, and the ability to write local files (e.g., generating PNG charts).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or escaping interpolated data read from the audited files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The audit procedure requires the execution of shell commands and local Python scripts to analyze the agent's state.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdprovides multiplepython3 -cone-liners and instructions for running thescripts/audit_overheads.pyutility.
Audit Metadata