library-rag
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses the
~/.hermes/.envfile to retrieveNVIDIA_API_KEYorOPENROUTER_API_KEY. While this is a standard configuration pattern for the skill, the.envfile is a sensitive path often containing credentials. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Text chunks from the library and user API keys are transmitted to external endpoints at
integrate.api.nvidia.comandopenrouter.aito generate embeddings. These are well-known services and the behavior is essential for the skill's functionality. - [PERSISTENCE]: The
SKILL.mdfile includes instructions and examples for users to configure persistent automated indexing using system tools likecron(Linux/macOS) orlaunchd(macOS). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from EPUB and PDF documents. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in a book could be retrieved and influence the agent's behavior during a search.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses SQLite's extension loading mechanism (
conn.enable_load_extension(True)) to dynamically load thesqlite-vecextension at runtime, which is required for vector search operations.
Audit Metadata