notebooklm-mode
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a script (
scripts/ingest_source.py) that dynamically modifies the Python module search path (sys.path) at runtime. It attempts to locate a dependency calledlibrary-ragby checking aLIBRARY_RAG_SCRIPTSenvironment variable and various relative or home-directory paths (e.g.,~/.hermes/skills/research/library-rag/scripts). Dynamically resolving and importing executable code from computed paths poses a security risk if the execution environment or filesystem is not strictly controlled. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from untrusted external sources to build a research vault, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
web_search,web_extract, andbrowsertools to fetch content from the internet, and also accepts user-provided files which are saved to thesources/directory. - Boundary markers: While the skill uses specific formatting tags like
[vault]and[background], it lacks robust instructions to ensure the agent ignores instructions embedded within the extracted source text. - Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to write files to the workspace, browse the web, and execute local scripts via the
terminaltool. - Sanitization: The skill includes a rule to strip credentials from ingested content, but it does not implement sanitization or filtering to detect malicious prompts within the sources.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes frequent use of the
terminaltool to run its internal Python scripts (ingest_source.pyandparse_reference.py) for indexing and reference resolution. Relying on shell execution for core functionality increases the agent's overall permission footprint and potential attack surface.
Audit Metadata