review-commit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides detailed instructions and templates for the agent to execute various command-line tools, including
git,npm,agent(Cursor),codex(OpenAI),claude(Anthropic), andmuse. It also includes several Python utility scripts (capture_dispatch_result.py,attest_file.py) that wrap shell operations likegit statususing safesubprocess.runpatterns (passing arguments as lists rather than raw strings). These operations are well-documented and are the primary intended function of the skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted external data, such as code diffs and specification documents (
SPEC.md). The following evidence chain documents the security posture: - Ingestion points: External content is ingested in
workflow-steps.md(Step 6), where reviewers are instructed to read the project's diff and spec file. - Boundary markers: The
confirm-round-protocol.md(§ Scope) establishes strict boundaries, instructing agents to ignore findings outside of the specific fix lines to prevent adversarial or irrelevant instructions from influencing the loop. - Capability inventory: The orchestrator has capabilities to write files, perform git commits, and dispatch multiple secondary agents (Cursor, Codex, Claude).
- Sanitization: The protocol requires the orchestrator to independently reproduce every claimed finding using minimal probes (
confirm-round-protocol.md§ Repro-before-fix) before incorporating them into a fix brief, effectively filtering out hallucinatory or malicious claims from processed data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes instructions to install the
@openai/codexpackage from the NPM registry. This reference targets a well-known service from a trusted technology provider (OpenAI) and is documented neutrally as a prerequisite for the review stage.
Audit Metadata