skill-quality-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external
SKILL.mdfiles which represent an ingestion point for untrusted data. Instructions embedded in audited skills could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the review process. - Ingestion points: The workflow in
SKILL.mdusesrepo.rglob('SKILL.md')to discover and read external instruction files for analysis. - Boundary markers: The audit methodology does not explicitly define delimiters or 'ignore instructions' warnings when reading audited content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
execute_code(Python) and file read/write operations across its scripts. - Sanitization: Analysis is performed via regular expressions and YAML parsing; however, the agent interprets the final audit report.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the agent's internal state database to generate usage statistics. While the data is used locally for analytics, it involves reading sensitive metadata files.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains a Python script that connects to the agent's local database usingsqlite3.connect(str(Path.home() / '.hermes' / 'state.db'))to count tool invocations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill encourages the use of shell-like operations and programmatic file system access to perform batch audits.
- Evidence: The skill uses
pathlibandos.walkto traverse directories and perform regex-based analysis on files within a repository. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the generation and execution of Python code snippets to perform quality checks.
- Evidence:
references/batch-checks.mdprovides multiple Python code blocks intended to be run via theexecute_codetool to validate frontmatter, check for identity leakage, and calculate trigger ratios.
Audit Metadata