skill-retrieval
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The test suite (
tests/test_stdlib_parity.py) executessubprocess.runto verify the Python environment and ensure heavy dependencies likenumpyorscipyare not loaded. This is a standard environment check for the plugin's performance guarantees. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The plugin performs runtime monkey-patching of the agent's internal
prompt_builder.build_skills_system_promptfunction in__init__.py. This modification is intended to implement the Phase 1 compaction logic described in the documentation, allowing the plugin to override the agent's default system prompt generation for token optimization. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user messages and external skill descriptions from
~/.hermes/skillsto build a BM25 index and inject relevant content into the LLM context, which constitutes a potential vulnerability surface. - Ingestion points: User messages in
_on_pre_llm_callandSKILL.mdfiles located in the agent's skills and plugins directories. - Boundary markers: Injected content is delimited by a "## Retrieved Skills" markdown header to separate it from user input.
- Capability inventory: The skill lacks network or sensitive file-write capabilities; it only retrieves text for injection into the agent's context.
- Sanitization: The skill implements length truncation for injected descriptions, limiting each to 200 characters.
Audit Metadata