capture-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local directories containing user interaction history, including
~/.claude/projects,~/.pi/agent/sessions, and~/.codex/sessions, as well as configuration directories like~/.agents/skills. - Evidence: The instructions explicitly search these paths to mine behavioral patterns and update existing workflow modes.
- Mitigation: The skill includes guardrails requiring the agent to only access paths where the user has granted access and mandates confirmation before reading session content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to interact with the local environment.
- Evidence: Uses
git log -1 --format=%cI <path>to determine when a skill was last edited for incremental mining. - Mitigation: The command is localized to metadata retrieval and does not involve complex pipe chains or remote source execution.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from session transcripts, which could contain adversarial instructions intended to be codified into the agent's persistent behavior modes.
- Ingestion points: Transcripts and session logs located in
~/.claude/projects,~/.pi/agent/sessions, and~/.codex/sessions(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no explicit delimiters or instruction-ignore markers defined for the mined content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
skill-creatorworkflow to write new instructions to disk and can perform Git operations (commit, push, PR) at the user's request (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill implements an "overfitting" check that requires patterns to be seen in at least two separate slices of history before codification, which provides a basic filter against one-off malicious inputs.
Audit Metadata