linear
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external sources such as Linear issues, comments, documents, and project-specific
LINEAR.mdfiles. This represents a vulnerability surface where instructions in an issue or comment could potentially influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points: The agent reads data via the Linear MCP server and local filesystem (
LINEAR.md) inSKILL.mdandreferences/artifacts.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded prompts in processed content, although role-based logic acts as a partial mitigation.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for Linear metadata updates, comment/document publication, and git operations such as branch creation and merging.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of external content is mentioned before use in prompts or durable artifacts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes example shell commands for users to configure the environment and mint OAuth tokens. These are provided as setup guidance for the user and are not automatically executed by the skill.
- Evidence: Shell command blocks in
references/setup.mddemonstratingcurlandpi/claudeCLI usage. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The setup instructions reference fetching data from well-known services for configuration.
- Evidence:
curlexample targetinghttps://api.linear.app/oauth/tokenfor token acquisition inreferences/setup.md.
Audit Metadata