teamlead-mode
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted task descriptions and user-provided decisions are ingested as part of the routing logic in
SKILL.mdand incorporated into theCONTEXTfield of thereferences/brief-template.md. - Boundary markers: The skill utilizes a structured format in
references/brief-template.md(using headers likeGOAL,SCOPE, andCONTEXT) to separate different types of information, which provides basic structural separation but lacks explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings. - Capability inventory: The lead agent has the capability to spawn and manage sub-agents using the
picommand and theherdrskill, as described inreferences/conventions.md. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions or automated steps defined to sanitize or escape data before it is passed from the lead agent into the execution environment or briefs of sub-agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Sub-agent process management.
- Evidence:
references/conventions.mdinstructs the agent to use thepitool (e.g., "Start Pi as a persistent interactive process") to initiate and manage delegated work streams. - [NO_CODE]: The skill consists of documentation and instructional templates.
- Evidence: The analyzed files (
SKILL.md,references/brief-template.md, andreferences/conventions.md) contain markdown-based instructions and templates rather than executable code files like Python or JavaScript.
Audit Metadata