research-wiki-motion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
README.mdfile exposes a hardcoded absolute local path:/Users/choemun-yeong/.codex/skills/.system/skill-creator/scripts/quick_validate.py. This discloses the local username (choemun-yeong) and internal directory structure of the developer's system, leading to information exposure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's verification checklist in
SKILL.mdandREADME.mdinstructs the agent to execute several shell commands, includingnpm run,uv run,npx, andgit. While these are intended for development workflows, they provide a significant capability for shell interaction that could be leveraged if the agent is directed to work on a compromised repository. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes and modifies application source code (
GraphView.tsx,styles.css) and executes tests based on that code. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions inside the processed files could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Source files located at
apps/vault-ui/frontend/src/components/GraphView.tsx,apps/vault-ui/frontend/src/styles.css, andapps/vault-ui/frontend/src/App.tsx. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific instructions or delimiters provided to help the agent distinguish between code and embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: Full shell execution capabilities via
npm,uv,npx, andpythonare available to the skill during its verification phase. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any sanitization or validation of the code content before processing it or executing related commands.
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