reverse-engineer-anything
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in SKILL.md mandate the use of
npx -y rea-agents@latest doctorandnpx -y rea-agents@latest setupfor environment alignment and provider troubleshooting. The use ofnpxwith the-yflag automatically installs and executes the specified package from the NPM registry without manual confirmation, while thelatesttag prevents version pinning, creating a vector for unverified remote code execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's setup process involves downloading external software, including the 'Hopper' disassembler, as noted in the readiness instructions.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
run_controlled_replaycapability described in references/controlled-replay.md allows for the dynamic execution of extracted JavaScript modules. Although the skill specifies this must occur within a sandbox and requires explicit operator approval, it remains a high-risk capability when processing untrusted code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest untrusted third-party data such as native binaries, mobile application packages (APK, IPA), and browser runtime memory. This ingestion occurs in a context where the agent has tools for filesystem writes and shell command execution.
- Ingestion points: Native binaries, extracted JavaScript trees, and browser targets.
- Boundary markers: Instructions require
approved: trueflags and use of specificplandigests before execution. - Capability inventory: Includes filesystem extraction (
extract_artifact), dynamic replay (run_controlled_replay), and shell-based setup tools (npx). - Sanitization: Employs sandboxing for module execution and verification specs to validate reconstructed code.
Audit Metadata