address-ticket

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly requests sensitive Atlassian credentials (email and API token) via interactive prompts if they are not found in the execution environment.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill retrieves an Atlassian OAuth token and includes it in a curl request to a URL obtained directly from untrusted JIRA ticket JSON. This allows an attacker to exfiltrate the token by providing a malicious URL in a ticket. Furthermore, the skill hardcodes a specific Atlassian tenant URL (tablecheck.atlassian.net) for GraphQL queries, which could lead to credentials being sent to an unintended organization's endpoint.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from JIRA tickets, comments, and attachments to define requirements and generate code that is subsequently executed.
  • Ingestion points: JIRA ticket metadata, descriptions, custom fields, comments, attachment files, and Figma design metadata.
  • Boundary markers: No protective delimiters or isolation instructions are provided to the sub-agents when processing this external data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including shell command execution (acli, fcli, curl, git), repository file modification, and the ability to run arbitrary test suites.
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the incoming ticket data or attachment content before it is processed by the agents.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 12, 2026, 11:04 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — address-ticket