requesting-code-review

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from git repositories and planning documents through multiple placeholders in the code-reviewer.md template without using boundary markers or sanitization techniques.
  • Ingestion points: The placeholders {WHAT_WAS_IMPLEMENTED}, {PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS}, {DESCRIPTION}, and {PLAN_REFERENCE} in code-reviewer.md ingest external content.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The template lacks delimiters (such as XML tags or explicit 'ignore instructions' warnings) to prevent the subagent from following malicious instructions embedded in the injected text.
  • Capability inventory: The subagent has the capability to execute shell commands (e.g., git diff) and dispatch further sub-tasks based on the review.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The instructions do not define validation or escaping for the content interpolated into the prompt template.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The code-reviewer.md template instructs the subagent to execute git commands using interpolated variables for commit SHAs. If these SHAs are manipulated by an attacker (e.g., via a compromised plan document), it could lead to command injection.
  • Evidence: The bash blocks containing git diff --stat {BASE_SHA}..{HEAD_SHA} and git diff {BASE_SHA}..{HEAD_SHA} in code-reviewer.md rely on runtime interpolation of variables that may originate from untrusted sources.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 09:54 PM