delegate-to-opencode
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a bundled Bash script (
scripts/claude-opencode-worker) to facilitate task delegation. This script in turn executes theopencodeCLI tool. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by passing instructions (a 'Task') to a secondary agent (
opencode). However, the skill implements robust mitigations: - It uses a quoted heredoc (
<<'TASK') when calling the script to prevent the task content from being expanded or executed as commands in the main agent's shell environment. - The helper script dynamically generates a configuration for the sub-agent that explicitly denies dangerous commands (e.g.,
git commit,git push,rm -rf) and restricts file access to the project directory. - The instructions explicitly mandate that the main agent must manually review and validate all changes produced by the sub-agent before acceptance.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The helper script uses a short Python snippet to parse a local JSON state file (
~/.local/state/opencode/model.json) to determine the last used model for theopencodetool. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The script accesses local configuration and state files (
~/.config/claude-opencode-worker/denyand~/.local/state/opencode/model.json) to configure the delegation environment. This is standard behavior for managing local tool state and user-defined security policies.
Audit Metadata