edge-candidate-agent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/auto_detect_candidates.pyallows the execution of an arbitrary external command via the--llm-ideas-cmdparameter. While intended to facilitate LLM-based ideation, this provides a mechanism for shell command execution from within the skill. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/validate_candidate.pydynamically constructs a Python code snippet and executes it usinguv run python -c. This involves interpolating filesystem paths and stage identifiers into a string that is subsequently executed as code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from multiple external sources, including OHLCV parquet files, CSV/Parquet tables for news and futures, and outputs from external commands. This untrusted content is used to populate fields like
hypothesisanddescriptionin generated research tickets. The mandatory evidence chain is as follows: - Ingestion points: Files provided via
--ohlcv,--hints,--news-reactions,--futures-ohlcv, and stdout from--llm-ideas-cmdinscripts/auto_detect_candidates.py. - Boundary markers: None; content is inserted directly into YAML structures.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
subprocess.run(found inauto_detect_candidates.pyandvalidate_candidate.py) and write files to the local filesystem (export_candidate.py). - Sanitization: Identifiers are sanitized via regex, but the natural language content from external sources is not filtered for potential prompt injection patterns before being stored in tickets.
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