trade-hypothesis-ideator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically loads and executes Python code from a computed file path in
scripts/pipeline/strategy_exporter.py. It attempts to import and run avalidate_interface_contractfunction from a file located at../../../../edge-candidate-agent/scripts/candidate_contract.pyrelative to the script's location. This pattern of dynamic loading from computed paths is a security risk if the file system environment or the target neighbor directory can be influenced by an attacker. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection due to the way it processes external data.
- Ingestion points: The
journal_snippetsfield in the input JSON is processed byscripts/pipeline/evidence_extractor.py. - Boundary markers: Absent. The extracted journal snippets are formatted into a markdown list within the
evidence_summaryand passed to the LLM without delimiters or instructions to ignore instructions embedded in the data. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write multiple files (
output_bundle.json,hypothesis_report.md,strategy.yaml,metadata.json) and perform dynamic code execution viaimportlib. - Sanitization: There is no sanitization, escaping, or validation of the content within
journal_snippetsbefore they are interpolated into the prompt template.
Audit Metadata