hsdd-adr
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using
nodeto run a registry generator script athsdd/scripts/gen-registry.mjs.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to access and copy files from the internal directories of other skills, specifically targeting~/.claude/skills/hsdd-contract/scripts/gen-registry.mjs. This involves cross-skill interaction and access to sensitive user home directories outside the immediate project scope.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests user-authored Markdown files and uses their content to influence future agent reasoning. - Ingestion points: Markdown files stored in the
hsdd/adr/directory. - Boundary markers: The skill extracts content based on
## Decisionand## Consequencesheaders but does not provide instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious prompts embedded in those sections. - Capability inventory: Extracted content is intended to be injected into 'phase contexts' as binding decisions, directly affecting the agent's future planning and execution steps.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or verification of the extracted file content is described before it is projected into the agent's operational context.
Audit Metadata