kelly-creators
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: According to
SKILL.md, the agent ingests data from external sources including niche descriptions, brand briefs, competitor creator lists, and exported candidate files to perform fit-scoring and draft outreach. - Boundary markers: The skill explicitly mandates that all agent-drafted outreach, briefs, and contracts must be reviewed and approved by a human operator before being executed through other channels.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write data to the Busabase backend via
busabase-provider.jsand mark engagements as completed using theexecute_decisions.mjsscript. It relies on other skills (e.g.,instagram-outreach,kelly-email) for actual message delivery. - Sanitization: The companion application uses an
escapeHtmlutility (defined inapp.jsandcreator-views.js) to sanitize data rendered in the UI, and the skill instructions inSKILL.mdemphasize storing only minimum necessary content for review. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill involves the execution of local scripts and commands as part of its operational workflow.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to runnode scripts/execute_decisions.mjs --applyto finalize approved engagements. - Evidence: The
README.mdprovides local development commands such aspnpm installandpnpm devfor the companion application. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires downloading standard Node.js dependencies for its local operation and companion app.
- Evidence: The
package.jsonfiles in the root andcontent/kelly-creators-app/list dependencies such asbusabase-sdk,hono, and@hono/node-server. These are fetched from standard package registries during installation.
Audit Metadata