kelly-instructor-sourcing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes candidate data (names, platform headlines, and search contexts) and scoring criteria hypothesis provided by the user.
- Ingestion points: Data is entered through the
/kelly-instructor-sourcing reviewandcriteriasubcommands and the corresponding Hono-based web interface, stored in thekelly-instructor-sourcing-candidatesandkelly-instructor-sourcing-criteriabases. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation explicitly states a 'sandbox-only' policy with deterministic data and lacks any capability to perform automated messaging or outbound platform connections, which significantly mitigates the impact of potential injection content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform authenticated mutations on Busabase records using
records.changeRequestandbases.createChangeRequest. It does not have access to shell execution, sensitive local files, or unauthorized network operations. - Sanitization: The application logic in
app.jsemploys a robustescapeHtmlutility to sanitize all user-supplied content before rendering it in the user interface, preventing cross-site scripting (XSS). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The project includes a build script in
package.jsonthat utilizesesbuild-wasmto bundle the Busabase SDK for browser use. This is a standard development task for preparing vendor assets and does not involve the execution of untrusted remote code at runtime.
Audit Metadata