kelly-launch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data to generate launch assets and checklists, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill gathers product context from user-provided sources such as product docs and positioning notes (referenced in
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill architecture enforces a human-in-the-loop pattern where all agent-generated drafts must be reviewed and approved in the
#/assetsUI route before execution. - Capability inventory: Through
scripts/execute_decisions.mjs, the skill can mark items as approved for hand-off to other specialized skills (likekelly-email) for public submission or sending. - Sanitization: The skill relies on manual human review and approval as the primary sanitization mechanism for generated content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes several utility scripts that perform file system and environment operations.
- Evidence:
scripts/execute_decisions.mjs,scripts/setup.mjs, andscripts/publish_airapp.mjsexecute logic that reads from environment variables (BUSABASE_API_KEY,BUSABASE_BASE_URL) and interacts with the Busabase API. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on several external Node.js packages for its web interface and data management.
- Evidence:
package.jsonandcontent/kelly-launch-app/package.jsonlist dependencies such asbusabase-sdk,hono, and@hono/node-server. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The development environment uses a build-time tool for bundling code.
- Evidence: The
build:sdkscript incontent/kelly-launch-app/package.jsonusesesbuild-wasmto bundle thebusabase-sdkinto the application's vendor directory.
Audit Metadata