kelly-mv
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user data (song metadata, cast visual notes, shot descriptions) which are then interpolated into prompts for image and video generation backends.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via
content/kelly-mv-app/app/js/providers/busabase-provider.js(reading from Busabase Bases) and UI forms incontent/kelly-mv-app/app/js/workspace-views.js. - Boundary markers: The skill uses basic structural separation in prompts (e.g., in
content/kelly-mv-app/app/js/mv-model.js), but lacks robust delimiters to prevent embedded instructions from influencing the generation models. - Capability inventory: The skill can perform network operations (calling external image APIs), write to the filesystem (via Busabase storage), and execute local Python scripts via subprocesses.
- Sanitization: Basic HTML escaping is performed in the frontend (
app.js), but there is no specialized sanitization for text being sent to LLM/Image generation prompts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several trusted scripts execute local processes to fulfill generation requests.
scripts/gen_draft_video.mjsspawns a Python process to runinference.pyfrom a localltx-videoinstallation.scripts/generate_song_draft.mjsspawnsscripts/gen_song.py(currently a stub).- These are functional requirements for the skill's local ML integration and use hardcoded or validated script paths.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external services to fulfill its primary purpose.
scripts/execute_generation_requests.mjsmakes POST requests to an OpenAI-compatible image generation API (defaults tomoonrouter.dev) using an API key provided via environment variables.
Audit Metadata