kelly-pr-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the GitHub (
gh) CLI to perform all repository interactions, including searching for pull requests, fetching diffs, and submitting reviews. These operations are performed viaexecFilein dedicated scripts such asscripts/generate_review_batch.mjsandscripts/execute_decisions.mjs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub pull requests, such as titles and bodies, which are ingested into the agent's context during batch generation. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious PR content could influence the agent's summary or proposed actions. The skill requires human approval in a companion UI (AirApp) before any mutations are submitted to GitHub.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/generate_review_batch.mjsfetches PR titles, bodies, and diffs from GitHub. - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt interpolation process.
- Capability inventory:
scripts/execute_decisions.mjsexecutesgh pr reviewcommands. - Sanitization: PR content is truncated for length but not sanitized for instruction markers.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with GitHub to fetch pull request data and with Busabase to store and retrieve the review queue. These operations target well-known and expected services for the skill's purpose.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill's scripts are designed to read configuration and secrets from environment variables and local files like
.envand~/.config/kelly-pr-review/config.json. These are used to manage authentication for Busabase and GitHub. No hardcoded credentials were found in the skill source code.
Audit Metadata