kelly-pr-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
ghCLI to interact with GitHub pull requests. Execution is handled viachild_process.execFileinscripts/generate_review_batch.mjs(for ingestion) andscripts/execute_decisions.mjs(for review submission). This is the primary purpose of the skill and is implemented using secure argument passing (arrays rather than shell strings) to prevent command injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external services including GitHub (via the CLI) and Busabase (via
busabase-sdk). Both are established platforms, and the interaction is restricted to fetching pull request data and storing review metadata. The skill follows best practices by using environment variables (BUSABASE_API_KEY,BUSABASE_SPACE_ID) for authentication rather than hardcoded secrets. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from GitHub pull requests (titles, bodies, and diffs).
- Ingestion points:
scripts/generate_review_batch.mjsfetches PR metadata and diffs usinggh search prsandgh pr diff. - Boundary markers: None identified in the ingestion scripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill can submit PR reviews (
gh pr review) and write to the Busabase database. - Sanitization: The
truncateTextfunction inscripts/generate_review_batch.mjslimits the ingested PR body to 2000 characters and the summary to 600 characters, reducing the attack surface. Furthermore, the mandatory human-in-the-loop approval process in the AirApp UI serves as a significant mitigation against automated execution of injected instructions.
Audit Metadata