kelly-pr-review

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the gh CLI to interact with GitHub pull requests. Execution is handled via child_process.execFile in scripts/generate_review_batch.mjs (for ingestion) and scripts/execute_decisions.mjs (for review submission). This is the primary purpose of the skill and is implemented using secure argument passing (arrays rather than shell strings) to prevent command injection.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external services including GitHub (via the CLI) and Busabase (via busabase-sdk). Both are established platforms, and the interaction is restricted to fetching pull request data and storing review metadata. The skill follows best practices by using environment variables (BUSABASE_API_KEY, BUSABASE_SPACE_ID) for authentication rather than hardcoded secrets.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from GitHub pull requests (titles, bodies, and diffs).
  • Ingestion points: scripts/generate_review_batch.mjs fetches PR metadata and diffs using gh search prs and gh pr diff.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the ingestion scripts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can submit PR reviews (gh pr review) and write to the Busabase database.
  • Sanitization: The truncateText function in scripts/generate_review_batch.mjs limits the ingested PR body to 2000 characters and the summary to 600 characters, reducing the attack surface. Furthermore, the mandatory human-in-the-loop approval process in the AirApp UI serves as a significant mitigation against automated execution of injected instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 25, 2026, 10:36 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — kelly-pr-review