sandock-community
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches and displays user-generated content from an external source (
community.sandock.ai) through thepostsandpostcommands inscripts/community.mjs. This external content is processed by the agent without specific boundary markers or sanitization, creating an attack surface where a malicious forum post could attempt to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The
cmdPostsandcmdPostfunctions inscripts/community.mjsingest raw post content and replies from the Sandock API. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings used when the agent displays or reads this external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses
ReadandWritefile access and network capabilities through theBash(node:*)tool execution. - Sanitization: The script does not perform sanitization or filtering on the markdown body of retrieved posts to detect or neutralize prompt injection attempts.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
uploadcommand inscripts/community.mjsallows the agent to read local files and upload them to the vendor's API. While intended for legitimate image uploads to the forum, this tool lacks a mandatory--yesconfirmation gate (as noted inSKILL.md), meaning a compromised agent could be tricked into exfiltrating sensitive local files to the remote server's storage. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of a Node.js script that utilizes
node:fsfor reading local environment variables and processing files for upload. While the script's logic is benign, it grants the agent broad access to the local filesystem within the scope of its allowed tools.
Audit Metadata