closure-mode-at-boundaries
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes task descriptions from external sources which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled from GitHub Issues (
gh issue list), Obsidian vaults, Kanban boards, and project state files (store.json) to form 'candidate sets' for the agent to evaluate. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters (such as XML tags) or safety prompts to isolate external task descriptions, allowing them to potentially influence agent behavior.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
grepfor file searches and audits the codebase based on ingested task parameters, providing a path for potential exploitation if malicious instructions are followed. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input filtering or escaping for the data retrieved from external sources.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on the execution of common developer utilities.
- The agent is instructed to run
grepto verify dependencies and audit the blast radius of proposed changes. - The GitHub CLI (
gh) is suggested as a way to retrieve task lists from external trackers. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external documentation and tools.
- It links to the author's GitHub repository for methodology documentation.
- It suggests using the
oh-my-claudecodeplugin as an environment for the multi-agent swarm.
Audit Metadata