closure-mode-at-boundaries

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes task descriptions from external sources which could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Data is pulled from GitHub Issues (gh issue list), Obsidian vaults, Kanban boards, and project state files (store.json) to form 'candidate sets' for the agent to evaluate.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters (such as XML tags) or safety prompts to isolate external task descriptions, allowing them to potentially influence agent behavior.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses grep for file searches and audits the codebase based on ingested task parameters, providing a path for potential exploitation if malicious instructions are followed.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input filtering or escaping for the data retrieved from external sources.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on the execution of common developer utilities.
  • The agent is instructed to run grep to verify dependencies and audit the blast radius of proposed changes.
  • The GitHub CLI (gh) is suggested as a way to retrieve task lists from external trackers.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external documentation and tools.
  • It links to the author's GitHub repository for methodology documentation.
  • It suggests using the oh-my-claudecode plugin as an environment for the multi-agent swarm.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 31, 2026, 09:18 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — closure-mode-at-boundaries