debugging

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions in verification-before-completion/SKILL.md employ coercive threats, stating 'If you lie, you'll be replaced', which is a pattern used to override an AI agent's internal safety and honesty protocols. It also uses 'Iron Laws' and mandates that 'violating the letter... is violating the spirit' to force compliance.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The systematic debugging framework requires the agent to ingest and act upon untrusted external data sources.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read error messages, stack traces, and git diffs (SKILL.md files).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat external log data as untrusted.
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes a shell script (find-polluter.sh) that executes npm test and provides instructions for using execFileAsync and codesign.
  • Sanitization: There is no requirement for the agent to sanitize or escape data extracted from logs or diffs before processing.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Diagnostic logging examples in systematic-debugging/SKILL.md instruct the agent to output sensitive information such as the IDENTITY environment variable and keychain identities via the security command.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided find-polluter.sh script executes shell commands and runs tests via npm test based on user-supplied search patterns, which could lead to arbitrary code execution if pointed at malicious test files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 05:15 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — debugging