debugging
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions in
verification-before-completion/SKILL.mdemploy coercive threats, stating 'If you lie, you'll be replaced', which is a pattern used to override an AI agent's internal safety and honesty protocols. It also uses 'Iron Laws' and mandates that 'violating the letter... is violating the spirit' to force compliance. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The systematic debugging framework requires the agent to ingest and act upon untrusted external data sources.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read error messages, stack traces, and git diffs (SKILL.md files).
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat external log data as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes a shell script (
find-polluter.sh) that executesnpm testand provides instructions for usingexecFileAsyncandcodesign. - Sanitization: There is no requirement for the agent to sanitize or escape data extracted from logs or diffs before processing.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Diagnostic logging examples in
systematic-debugging/SKILL.mdinstruct the agent to output sensitive information such as theIDENTITYenvironment variable and keychain identities via thesecuritycommand. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided
find-polluter.shscript executes shell commands and runs tests vianpm testbased on user-supplied search patterns, which could lead to arbitrary code execution if pointed at malicious test files.
Audit Metadata