rednote-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill extracts content from external Xiaohongshu notes using
scripts/dump_note.pyand returns it to the agent as Markdown, creating a vulnerability to instructions embedded in external content. - Ingestion points: Content is fetched from arbitrary note URLs via
scripts/dump_note.py. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the extracted note data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including publishing notes, uploading files, commenting, and following users.
- Sanitization: Absent. No sanitization or filtering of external note content is performed before it is presented to the agent.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages authentication by storing session cookies in
rednote_cookies.json. While necessary for browser automation persistence, this file contains sensitive authentication tokens in plain text on the local filesystem. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/publish_note.pyscript accepts a list of file paths via the--image-urlsargument and passes them to Playwright'sset_filesmethod. An agent could be manipulated via prompt injection to provide paths to sensitive local files (such as~/.ssh/id_rsa), which the script would then attempt to upload to the Xiaohongshu platform.
Audit Metadata