vectorcraft
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes complex external vector and document formats (SVG, PDF, DXF, EPS) using the
app.openanddocument.inspectmethods. Maliciously crafted files could contain instructions in metadata or text fields to influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points: Documents loaded via
app.open,file.open, andfile.placeas described inSKILL.mdandreferences/control-protocol.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the document structure.
- Capability inventory: Access to file system writes (
app.save), workspace capture (ui.screenshot), browser redirection (attributes.openUrl), and plugin installation (ui.installPlugin). - Sanitization: The skill does not mention any validation or sanitization of document content before it is added to the agent's context.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
ui.installPlugincommand inreferences/control-protocol.mdallows the installation and execution of.wasmbinary files. Loading unverified plugins poses a risk of arbitrary code execution within the application context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing local binaries
vectorcraft-cliandvectorcraft. The control protocol runs over a loopback TCP port without authentication, which is noted as a security trade-off in the documentation. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill can capture user workspace content using
ui.screenshotandui.render. Additionally, theattributes.openUrlcommand can be used to open arbitrary URLs in a web browser, representing a potential data exfiltration vector if sensitive information is passed via URL parameters. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external protocol documentation and source repositories hosted on a public GitHub account (
github.com/storytold/vectorcraft).
Audit Metadata