balise-motion-graphic
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto execute various external binaries and system tools. This includesffmpegandffprobefor video processing,magickandidentify(ImageMagick) for image manipulation, and package managers for environment setup. - Evidence: Found in
scripts/extract_reference_frames.py(FFmpeg),scripts/remove_chroma_key.py(ImageMagick), andscripts/setup_asset_pipeline.py(Pip and system package managers). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill contains automation for downloading and installing external software, specifically the
PillowPython library and system-level media tools. - Evidence:
scripts/setup_asset_pipeline.pymanages the installation of dependencies usinguv,pip, or system-level managers likebrew,apt-get, orwinget. - Context: The instructions in
references/asset-acquisition.mdexplicitly gate these operations behind user authorization requirements. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The setup script includes commands that utilize
sudoto install system-wide dependencies on Linux platforms. - Evidence:
scripts/setup_asset_pipeline.pycontains theimagemagick_install_commandfunction which usessudoforapt-get,dnf, andpacmanoperations. - Context: This is a legitimate requirement for system-level tool installation, and the skill instructions mandate explicit user approval before performing administrator-level actions.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/remove_chroma_key.pyscript includes logic to dynamically re-execute itself using a different Python interpreter path identified at runtime (specifically to transition into an isolated virtual environment). - Evidence: The
reexec_isolatedfunction inscripts/remove_chroma_key.pyusessubprocess.runto restart the script using a path determined byvenv_python(). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted external media (video and images) and integrate content from external AI services (Magnific, Higgsfield).
- Ingestion points:
scripts/extract_reference_frames.py(user-provided MP4 files),references/asset-acquisition.md(external image assets). - Boundary markers: The skill employs a multi-stage validation workflow (Direction, Composition, Rhythm, Craft), though it lacks specific technical sanitization for media metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write access, command execution (FFmpeg/ImageMagick), and network interaction capabilities via MCPs.
- Sanitization: Not explicitly implemented for media stream metadata.
- Severity: LOW.
Audit Metadata