tk-pr-rebase
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon data from external PRs, including head/base repositories, review threads, and check states. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded in a PR description or a review comment could potentially influence the agent's logic during the rebase or verification process.
- Ingestion points: The skill fresh-reads repository metadata, PR numbers, head/base SHA values, and review thread content from GitHub at the start of its workflow.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to separate untrusted PR data from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including file system access (worktree creation), command execution (git rebase, git push), and network interaction (GitHub API for reviews and PR updates).
- Sanitization: There are no documented steps for escaping or validating the content retrieved from GitHub review threads before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs sensitive Git operations that mutate the repository state and affect remote history.
- Evidence: The instructions explicitly authorize the use of
git rebaseandgit push --force-with-lease. While the skill includes safety checks (refspec validation), these commands remain high-impact operations. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses environment variables and sensitive local Git configuration to verify workspace provenance.
- Evidence: The skill inspects
GIT_DIR,GIT_COMMON, and the output ofgit rev-parse --show-superproject-working-treeto determine isolation boundaries. While used for safety checks, this involves reading the local environment configuration.
Audit Metadata