tk-questioning
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates executable content at runtime.
- Evidence:
references/visual-questions.mdinstructs the agent to create an HTML file (questions.html) in a temporary directory (.tigerkit/tmp/<calling-skill>/<run-id>/). This file includes inlined JavaScript and CSS retrieved from local assets belonging to thetk-writingskill. - Risk: While the generated file is intended for local visual aids, the assembly of HTML and JavaScript at runtime provides a vector for malicious content injection if external or untrusted data is included in the HTML body or script logic without sufficient sanitization.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data to generate interactive prompts, creating a potential surface for indirect injection attacks.
- Ingestion points:
references/questions.md(reads facts and 'evidence' from the current context to formulate questions). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not explicitly specify the use of delimiters or boundary markers for untrusted data when interpolating it into the questions.
- Capability inventory: File system writing (
references/visual-questions.md), and invocation of platform-specific user input tools (AskUserQuestion,request_user_input,clarify). - Sanitization: The skill mentions applying a 'feedback post-processing' step from the
tk-writingskill to the generated HTML. - Risk: Malicious data within the processed 'evidence' could influence the phrasing or choices presented in the user questions, potentially leading the user to approve unintended or risky actions.
Audit Metadata