tk-wt
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from external and potentially untrusted sources such as issue descriptions, PR reviews, and CI logs.\n
- Ingestion points: Data is read from repository files (
orca.yaml,tigerkit.config.json), Git command outputs, and external issue trackers (SKILL.md,references/configuration.md).\n - Boundary markers: The skill explicitly defines a "Retrieved Evidence Boundary" section which instructs the agent to treat natural language from external sources strictly as data, ensuring it cannot override the skill's protocols or authority (
SKILL.md).\n - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute
gitandorcaCLI commands and trigger repository-tracked scripts (SKILL.md,references/configuration.md).\n - Sanitization: There are explicit instructions to ignore instruction-like text found within processed data and to stop execution if the context identity is unverifiable (
SKILL.md).\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill allows for the execution of automation hooks during the worktree lifecycle.\n - Evidence: The configuration policy supports
onCreateScriptandonCloseScriptfields in JSON configuration files (references/configuration.md).\n - Mitigation: Execution is strictly limited to repository-relative tracked script paths. The skill prohibits the use of absolute paths, parent directory traversal (
..), symlinks, or untracked code, and requires the agent to verify user authorization before every execution.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on system-level Git and Orca commands for its primary operations.\n - Evidence: Instructions detail the use of
git worktree add,git worktree remove, and variousorca worktreecommands (SKILL.md,references/worktree-operations.md). Safety checks are mandated to verify worktree ownership and branch identity before destructive operations.
Audit Metadata