ideate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its handling of untrusted user input.
- Ingestion points: The problem statement provided via
$ARGUMENTSinSKILL.mdis ingested and used to drive the entire agent workflow. - Boundary markers: The instructions in
rules/divergence.mdinterpolate the "selected framing" (derived from user input) into subagent prompts without explicit boundary delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings. - Capability inventory: The skill can spawn multiple subagents (generators, judges) and perform persistent memory writes through
memory.write. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or structural validation of the problem statement content before it is processed by subagents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill references local scripts that are executed during diagnostic and validation phases.
- Evidence:
rules/diagnostic-surface.mddeclaresnode scripts/eval/l1.mjsandbash scripts/sync-symlinks.shas repository validators. - Context: While these are standard development tools, they represent shell and runtime execution within the local environment.
Audit Metadata