jev-assert
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted text data captured from browser environments (accessibility tree or visible text) and provides this content to an LLM-based model for evaluation. Ingestion points:
scripts/jev-call.mjsingests untrusted page state via standard input or from a file path specified by the--state-filecommand-line argument. Boundary markers: The untrusted state is included directly as a JSON propertystate.page_textin the request body to the Jev API, lacking specific delimiters or instructions for the receiving model to ignore embedded markers. Capability inventory: Withinscripts/jev-call.mjs, the skill uses the globalfetchAPI to transmit data to the Jev API atapi.typesafe.ai. Sanitization: There is no sanitization or filtering of the ingested page content before it is forwarded to the AI model, creating a surface where malicious UI content could attempt to manipulate the verification judgment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines a Node.js utility script (
scripts/jev-call.mjs) which is executed by the agent to perform network-based assertions and process semantic verdicts.
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