optimize-approach
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from diffs, intent summaries, and technical plans, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. \n
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
diff,intent_summary, andchanged_filesinSKILL.md, andapproachandsurveydata inrules/plan-mode.md. \n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to separate untrusted data from the agent's instructions. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to file-writing tools (
Edit,Write) and can execute shell commands (pnpm,tsc,pytest,git) via the procedures inrules/apply-mode.md. \n - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is present to filter malicious instructions embedded within the processed code or descriptions. \n
- Remediation: Implement strict boundary markers (e.g., XML tags or clear delimiters) and explicit instructions to the agent to treat diff and intent content as data only, never as instructions.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to verify code changes. \n
- Evidence:
rules/apply-mode.mdspecifies the execution ofpnpm test,tsc --noEmit,pytest, andgit checkoutto validate and potentially revert changes.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs shell command strings using file paths provided in the input data. \n - Evidence: In
rules/apply-mode.md, the skill generates commands likepnpm test <changed>.test.tsandpytest <changed>_test.pywhere<changed>is an unvalidated file path derived from the input diff. \n - Remediation: Ensure file paths are strictly validated against the current repository's file system and use safe execution APIs that prevent shell injection (e.g., passing arguments as an array rather than a single string).
Audit Metadata