persistent-memory

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted conversation data (last 50 turns) and persists it as markdown, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in one conversation could influence future sessions.
  • Ingestion points: Conversation history and previously stored memory files (INDEX.md and entries/).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly use delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings when loading memory into context.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has extensive file system capabilities, including reading, writing, moving (archiving), and deleting files across three storage tiers.
  • Sanitization: Mitigations include a mandatory consent preview showing a diff of planned changes, a privacy pre-flight check that refuses sensitive data, and a confidence-scoring system that rejects model inferences by default.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation includes instructions for users to install the @lorekit/cli tool via npx to enable advanced scaling features. This involves downloading and executing code from a remote registry.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses potentially sensitive file paths such as ~/.agent-memory/ and project-local .agent/ directories. However, this access is fundamental to its purpose of context persistence, and it explicitly refuses to store credentials or secrets detected in the environment or conversation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 30, 2026, 01:23 PM