preview-spec
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub pull request descriptions to extract test specifications.
- Ingestion points: The
runoperation reads the PR body usinggh pr viewormcp__github__pull_request_read(found inrules/runner.md). - Boundary markers: The skill relies on HTML comment markers
<!-- preview-spec:v1 -->and<!-- /preview-spec:v1 -->to isolate the spec (defined inrules/spec-format.md). - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the file system, execute GitHub CLI commands, and dispatch sub-agents (
aw-tester) as described inrules/runner.md. - Sanitization: While the skill extracts content based on markers, the content within those markers is treated as a domain-specific language for testing, which could be manipulated by a malicious PR author to influence the behavior of the testing sub-agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates configuration and specification files at runtime.
- Evidence: In
rules/runner.md, Step 3 describes materializingspecs.mdandaw-target.ymlunder an ephemeral.agent/{branch}/.preview-spec/directory. These files are generated from templates and PR data to be consumed by theaw-testerrunner. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the GitHub CLI (
gh) to perform various metadata operations. - Evidence:
rules/preview-url-resolution.mddetails the use ofgh apito fetch deployment and status information from GitHub's official repositories API. These commands are part of the intended functionality for resolving preview URLs.
Audit Metadata