preview-spec

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub pull request descriptions to extract test specifications.
  • Ingestion points: The run operation reads the PR body using gh pr view or mcp__github__pull_request_read (found in rules/runner.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill relies on HTML comment markers <!-- preview-spec:v1 --> and <!-- /preview-spec:v1 --> to isolate the spec (defined in rules/spec-format.md).
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the file system, execute GitHub CLI commands, and dispatch sub-agents (aw-tester) as described in rules/runner.md.
  • Sanitization: While the skill extracts content based on markers, the content within those markers is treated as a domain-specific language for testing, which could be manipulated by a malicious PR author to influence the behavior of the testing sub-agent.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates configuration and specification files at runtime.
  • Evidence: In rules/runner.md, Step 3 describes materializing specs.md and aw-target.yml under an ephemeral .agent/{branch}/.preview-spec/ directory. These files are generated from templates and PR data to be consumed by the aw-tester runner.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the GitHub CLI (gh) to perform various metadata operations.
  • Evidence: rules/preview-url-resolution.md details the use of gh api to fetch deployment and status information from GitHub's official repositories API. These commands are part of the intended functionality for resolving preview URLs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 12:51 PM