storybook
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates JavaScript/TypeScript scripts at runtime for two primary purposes: authentication flows and adversarial validation probes. These scripts are rendered from templates defined in
rules/auth.mdandrules/adversarial-validation.md, written to ephemeral files under.agent/storybook/, and then executed usingnpx playwright test. This pattern involves generating executable code from configuration and external inputs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive shell command execution, including background process management using
nohup, process termination viakill, and interaction with system-level credential managers such as the macOSsecurityutility, Linuxsecret-tool, and Windows DPAPI via PowerShell. It also executes arbitrary scripts defined in the project'spackage.json(e.g., Storybook start scripts). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill manages highly sensitive authentication data. While it correctly implements best practices by utilizing OS-level keychains for passwords and requiring
storageState.json(which contains session cookies and tokens) to be gitignored under.agent/storybook/.auth/, the handling of these session tokens within the agent's workspace presents a risk if not properly constrained. The auth flow fallback to environment variables (STORYBOOK_AUTH_<PROFILE>_PASSWORD) is also a potential exposure vector if environment logs are captured. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from the target repository's
package.jsonand component source code. - Ingestion points: Extracts component names, props, variants, and metadata from production
.tsxfiles and configuration frompackage.jsonandauth.config.json. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instruction-ignoring delimiters are specified for the processing of inferred component metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities including arbitrary shell execution (
npm,npx), system credential access, and file writing across the repository. - Sanitization: There is no documented sanitization of component props or metadata before they are interpolated into the dynamically generated test scripts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill triggers external downloads of browser binaries and testing infrastructure via
npx playwright install. These downloads originate from well-known and trusted sources (Microsoft/Playwright) and are documented here for transparency, though they do not contribute to a high severity verdict under trusted source rules.
Audit Metadata